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Central Eastern Europe*
ABSTRACT:
Among the stylised facts of economic transformation in East Cen-
tral Europe are the following unpleasant developments-: the re-
emergence of fiscal deficits, the resilliance of medium infla-
tion, and sluggish output recovery. This paper reviews the major
interpretations found in the literature, including structuralist
and demand-led approaches, and argues specifically against macro-
economic policy reversal. The concept of soft budget constraints
for the state owned enterprise sector is used to develop an in-
stitutional interpretation of macroeconomic imbalances in the
transformation process. Appropriate indicators of budget softness
are derived and applied to the Polish evidence. The results
support the hypothesis that current macroeconomic policy concerns
are related to the continuing tolerance of loss making firms.The
causes of soft budget constraints are found in perverse incen-
tives in the financial sector, unclarified ownership rights, and
the political reluctance to face large scale unemployment. A
strict enforcement of bankruptcy is urged as a precondition for
successful structural transformation.
* This paper was produced as part of a project on Economic Trans-
formation in Central Eastern Europe: Liberalisation, Stabilisa-
tion and Privatisation. Financial support from the Volkswagen
Foundation is greatfully acknowledged. The author also wishes
to thank Claudia Buch, Norbert Funke, Ralph Heinrich, Peter
Nunnenkamp, and Holger Schmieding for helpful comments and
discussions on an earlier draft.I. Introduction
Well into the second year of economic transformation in Central
Eastern Europe the lack of strong recovery tendencies is testing
the patience of politicians and the populations alike. Ethnic
conflict, parliamentary stalemate, rising nationalism, and the
persistent strength of the old nomenclature present the biggest
fears to Western observers, who urge the reformers in government
not to change course. However, even amongst Western economists
the reasons for the current crisis are increasingly debated.
This paper seeks to develop a broad conceptual framework, that
may be able to reach beyond country differences, in suggesting an
interpretation for some of the observable stylised facts of eco-
nomic transition from socialism to capitalism. Thereby, the
lessons from developing countries with stabilisation and structu-
ral adjustment are incorporated, where applicable. In particular
current debates on structuralist, demand-led, and credit supply-
led causes of recession following stabilisation and liberalisa-
tion in Central Eastern Europe shall be addressed. In contrast to
macroeconomic frameworks the thrust of the present analysis is to
relate microeconomic and institutional factors to disappointing
macroeconomic performance. In this it is somewhat similar to the
structuralist view, however, it seeks to explain why after the
necessary adaptive shock, resulting from the reallocation of
resources, economic growth has so far not materialised. While
macroeconomic policies certainly remain of paramount importance,
the eyes of policy makers are directed to the remaining institu-
tional imperfections in the Central Eastern European economies.
The paper is organised as follows: The first section presents
some stylised facts of economic performance in the region since
1990. The second section reviews some of the interpretations
found in the literature. The third section develops the analy-
tical framework of the paper, introducing the idea of soft budget
constraints and discussing some appropriate indicators. The
fourth section provides an application to Polish data. The fifth
section concludes the paper with some policy recommendations.SECTION 1: Some Stylised Facts of Economic Transformation
In a recent evaluation of stabilisation and reform in Eastern
Europe Michael Bruno claims that price level and exchange rate
stabilisation has largely been successful and rapid (Bruno,
1992). However, structural change and positive output response to
the new incentive structure proceeds more slowly. This divergence
in the pace of adjustment has led to the emergence of the follo-
wing policy concerns in the second phase of transition to a mar-
ket economy:
1) Inflationary tendencies have not completely subsided (Table
1). In all former CMEA countries (with the exception of Hungary,
which followed a gradual price liberalisation strategy) the ini-
tial price shock was much larger than expected. Moreover, apart
from Czechoslovakia, monthly inflation has persisted around the
3-5 per cent range in Poland, 2 per cent in Hungary, and infla-
tion is currently running at several hundred percent annually in
Bulgaria and Romania (Kopint Datorg, 199 2,2).
The resilience of medium inflation (20-50 per cent p.a.) is a
characteristic that Central Eastern Europe shares with other sta-
bilisation experiences (Bolivia 1985, Mexico 1987, Chile 1974,
Israel 1985, see Sachs ed., 1990; Aspe, 1992; Bruno 1992). In the
words of Pedro Aspe, Mexican Finance Minister:"It is much easier
to reduce inflation from 200 per cent p. a. to 20 per cent, than
it is to cut it from 20 per cent to 2 per cent" (Lionel Robbins
Memorial Lecture Jan. 1992, LSE). However, this should not give
rise to complacency. As Latin American experiences have shown,
inflation rarely stays on a medium plateau (Dornbusch, 1991). The
persistence of medium inflation may be due to inertia in the
adjustment of nominal wage contracts and mark-up pricing. This
argument shall be considered again below. Here it suffices toTable 1 - Monthly Consumer Price Inflation for selected Central Eastern






































































































































































































































are estimates from quarterly data.
Source: Bruno (1992).voice some concern at inflation rates that exceed the 20 per cent
p.a. benchmark (Bruno, 1992, suggests this as a useful dividing
line), as they point to some underlying instability in the econo-
my.
2) Contrary to previous stabilisation experiences and predictions
before economic reforms were initiated, fiscal deficits (in
Poland and Czechoslovakia in particular) have followed a U curve
pattern. The Latin American experiences with stabilisation from
high inflation rates suggest that restoring fiscal balance within
two years of the start of the programme was essential to prevent
inflation resurgence. In Bolivia a cash flow surplus was achieved
after 6 months (Sachs ed., 1990). In Mexico the swing of the pri-
mary balance from a 6 per cent deficit to a 4.2 per cent surplus
was managed in 1982-83, but public sector borrowing requirements
only gradually came down from 13 per cent in 1982 to 1.6 per cent
in 1991 (Aspe, 1992). All the more surprisingly the Polish gov-
ernment presented a projected overall surplus of 8 per cent of
CDP after only 6 months of stabilisation (Gomulka, 1991a). At the
end of 1990 the surplus still reached 3.5 per cent of GDP after a
7 per cent deficit in 1989 (Bruno, 1992). However, matters have
worsened considerably since Gomulka quotes a 4.5 per cent deficit
for 1991. For 1992 a limit of 5 per cent was agreed with the IMF,
but after the Polish parliament failed to approve a freeze in
pensions and public sector wages in March 1992, it is doubtful
whether the target will be met.
In Czechoslovakia the situation was initially somewhat different
as the country had a tradition of balanced budgets (Bruno, 1992;
Fischer and Gelb, 1991; Dlouhy, 1989). Nonetheless, the fiscal
position had deteriorated at the end of 1990 (State Bank of Cze-
A comparatively tough budget was agreed upon in June, while
recent negotiations with the IMF included some flexibility on
the fiscal target of up to 8 per cent deficit/GDP.choslovakia, 1992). Net credit to government increased by 918.6
per cent over the year to 52.2 bn koruna. The deficit was dras-
tically reduced in the first half of 1991 (Hrncir, 1992; Bruno,
1992), however by April this year it had again reached around 2-3
per cent of GDP and is estimated to increase much further towards
year-end (Czechoslovak Business Update, Sept. 1992).
The reasons underlying the U shaped path of fiscal deficits in
Central Eastern Europe are considered in more detail in sections
three and four. They are certainly one of the surprising facts of
the transformation process. One aspect can be found in the struc-
ture of the pre-transition tax system, which was based on corpo-
2
rate profit and income taxation . Initially state sector profit-
ability was very high in Czechoslovakia and Poland, a fact that
requires further explanation (Schaffer, 1991). However, the long
run tendency in transition is for state revenue to fall dramati-
cally, both as a result of decentralisation and lower profit-
ability due to competition (McKinnon, 1992). It is therefore of
outmost importance to find alternative sources of revenue (VAT^
and personal income taxes). In Poland the introduction of VAT has
now been delayed twice, while Hungary braces itself for a 4 per
cent budget deficit in spite of having introduced VAT back in
1988. Because of these difficulties careful monitoring of expen-
ditures is required, too. The generally precarious position of
state finances in Central Eastern Europe should give rise to
concern, particularly if the government falls back on the infla-
tion tax to cover current expenditure.
3) The response of output to the radically changed structure of
relative prices has been surprisingly slow. The initial drop in
production was partly anticipated as a structural "J-curve" phe-
nomenon and may be due primarily to dishoarding and the elimina-
2
In Poland corporate income taxes reached 16 per cent of GDP in
1989) .
It should be kept in mind that Hungary continues to service its
foreign debt which stood at $20.3 bn in 1990. This corresponds
to a 65 per cent debt service ratio, unusually high by inter-
national standards (Hare and Revesz, 1992).tion of forced substitution (Gomulka, 1991a; see also Siebert,
1991; 1992). However estimates for 1992 signal further declines
in output for all Central Eastern European economies. In Poland
GDP fell by 12 per cent in 1990, 8 per cent in 1991 and is expec-
4
ted to fall another 1-5 per cent this year. In Czechoslovakia
GDP dropped by 16 per cent in 1991 and data from the level of
industrial production (a drop of 16 per cent in the first 4
months, Kopint Datorg, 19 92) suggest a further sharp decline this
year. Hungary has experienced a steady downturn of economic acti-
vity since 1989, which somewhat accelerated from 4 per cent to 8
per cent in 1991. A major reason for the fall in 1991 is of
course the collapse of CMEA trade accounting for 8 per cent of
GDP in Hungary, 9 per cent in Czechoslovakia, and 4 per cent in
Poland (Bruno, 1992). Poland's output curve displays a two step
fall at the beginning of each year respectively, Czechoslovakia
takes the two steps in one go to land at a level slightly above
Poland, while Hungary rather slides down to its current GDP level
15 per cent below 1989 (Graph 1). The experiences of Bulgaria and
Romania mirror the Czechoslovak case.
4) The recession in Central Eastern Europe is accompanied by the
new and politically unsettling experience of large unemployment.
Official reported unemployment currently stands at 12 per cent in
Poland, 9 per cent in Hungary, and an average of 7 per cent in
4
Berg and Sachs (1992) claim the actual fall in Polish GDP in
1990 was much less than suggested by the statistics. They com-
pute their own estimates of GDP both from the demand and the
supply side. Using household survey data to estimate consump-
tion in the first case rather than relying on the statistical
wage, they find that GDP fell by only 4.9 per cent. When GDP is
computed from the production side, the rise in services and the
small scale private sector, which is usually underreported in
official data, would lower the estimate for output decline
considerably to 8.7 per cent. The Berg and Sachs methodology
involves a very liberal use of "guesstimates" such as for pri-
vate retail trade inventories, and deduces value added changes
from changes in employment without accounting for changes in
labour productivity. This is not the place to develop a well
grounded critique of their work, but in the absence of more
evidence I shall stick to official data. Note finally that the
degree of output fall does not change the main feature of in-
terest here, namely the lack of recovery after the initial
slump.Graph 1 -
Gross Domestic Product Index
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a
Source Gomulka (1991a), Bruno (1992), Koprint Datorg (1992),
Figures for 1992 are estimates, figures for 1991 are preliminary.
Czechoslovakia (Kopint Datorg, 1992). In the latter case the
Czech lands suffer far less with only 4 per cent unemployment,
while Slovakia faces problems similar to Bulgaria and Poland with
11 per cent unemployment. Maybe the surprising observation about
these figures is that they are so low. Considering the dramatic
fall in output since the onset of reforms and the fact that cen-
trally planned economies (CPEs) were typically characterised by
labour hoarding, the lag of unemployment behind the fall in out-
put in all Central Eastern European economies suggests that an
unemployment level far above the EC average of 9 per cent may be
more consistent with labour market equilibrium. Particularly inthe process of large scale privatisation unemployment rates
closer to 20 per cent of the active labour force (not counting
retreat from the labour force by female workers) as evidenced in
East Germany seem quite probable.
The above mentioned four concerns could be amended by others. On
the macroeconomic front the external balance should be closely
watched to assess the speed of trade reorientation towards Wes-
tern export markets after the collapse of the CMEA. As experi-
ences in Latin America have shown, it is counterproductive to
simply curtail imports and thus prevent balance of payments defi-
cits (Sachs ed., 1990). Economic growth will require technology
transfers and capital goods imports on a large scale. However,
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia have all shown some export
improvements. Particularly in Hungary the trade statistics for
1992 will be part of the good news (Kopint Datorg, 1992). In/
Poland the trade balance during 1990-91 seemed to follow the
fiscal developments. An initial trade surplus, achieved by a
large upfront devaluation, turned out to be transitory. Since the
exchange rate regime was changed from the nominal fixed anchor to
a crawling peg in May 1991, however, the trade balance has im-
proved again, reversing the analogy to fiscal developments. The
surplus for the first quarter of 1992 reached $385 million, due
to a 5.7 per cent increase in exports and a 15 per cent fall in
imports (Kopint Datorg, 1992).
On the microeconomic side it is now clear that events are pro-
ceeding much slower than was hoped for. Particularly large scale
privatisation is foot-dragging. The particular legal arrangements
cannot be reviewed here (see Frydman and Rapazcinski, 1991;
Hinds, 1991; Lipton and Sachs, 1991, for alternative proposals,
Heinrich, 199 2, for an evaluation). In sections 3 and 4 the im-
plications of the continuing dominance of concentrated public
sector firms shall be considered. Before doing that the three
main interpretations of the policy concerns outlined above are
assessed on the basis of the available literature.
This contentions should be read with care. In the context of
large statistical uncertainty unemployment figures are par-
ticularly unreliable.10
SECTION 2: Schumpeter, Keynes and the Credit Crunch
Some observers have likened the recession in Central Eastern
Europe to the structural shock administered to the industrial
sector in the West following the second oil price hikes in 1979
(Lipton and Sachs, 1990). Schumpeter's notion of creative
destruction is borrowed to explain why initially the output
response to price liberalisation is negative (Gomulka, 1991a).
The input price shock following the substantial rise in adminis-
trative prices leads traditional industries into demise that were
maintaining high capacities due to the prevalence of excess
demand (Kornai, 1980). As forced substitution is eliminated some
firms face a inward shift in their demand schedule. At the same
time new industries that could take advantage of the change in
relative prices are slow to emerge.
\
Graph 2 below illustrates the idea of a structural supply shock.
Before price liberalisation the economy is at point B, causing
excess demand AB. After price liberalisation both aggregate de-
mand and aggregate supply shift inward. Macroeconomic stabilisa-
tion policies are used to obtain a new equilibrium at C, that
reflects the input price supply shocks and the shift of aggregate
demand due to a fall of statistical real income. At any point to
the right of C excess demand would prevail, to the left of C lie
cases of policy overshooting. Note that the aggregate price level
was also increased, determining the degree of macroeconomic
austerity expressed by the size of the D-curve shift.
The above argument is attractive. The general J-curve pattern it
describes explains why the initial recession is inevitable in any
transition path (Siebert, 1991). However, the structuralist view
is unable to explain several of the stylised facts discussed
before. First, post stabilisation inflation can only be accounted
for by macroeconomic policies that fail to reduce aggregate
demand in line with the inward shift in aggregate supply. This
narrow focus on the macroeconomics of transition fails to address
institutional legacies that make for inertia in the economy11
Graph 2 - The Structural Supply-Shock and the Necessary
Reduction in Excess Demand
Y'
Source: Gomul.ka (1991 a)
(Portes, 1992). Second, if structural reasons dominate in reces-
sion, then output falls should be branch specific. They are not.
As Hare and Hughes (1992) show, in spite of wide initial diffe-
rences in industrial competitiveness across sectors, the libera-
lisation of prices does not seem to have led to a significant
reallocation of factors to the most efficient industries. The
rather uniform pattern in labour productivity and profitability
remains to be explained (Calvo and Coricelli, 1992b). Moreover,
the particular development of state finances is not contained in
the structuralist view. Rather a fiscal J-curve would have been
expected (Bruno, 1992). In sum, as long as output developments in12
Central Eastern Europe take the shape of an L, the J-curve propo-
nents are challenged to provide additional arguments to account
for the evidence.
From a different perspective, the structuralist view has been
attacked for the justification it provides for overly tight
macroeconomic management. It is argued that this may lead to
policy "overshooting" and the perpetuation of recession. There
are essentially two different views that are both expressing such
criticism, the Keynesian and the credit crunch hypothesis.
Keynesians see output determined from the aggregate demand side.
While they would agree that a small transitional inward shift of
aggregate supply may be possible, there is no a priori reason why
output should fall during the process of reallocating resources.
According to Keynesians, total factor productivity should in-
crease in the economy, and since labour resources are unchanged,
even the scrapping of some of the old capital stock would not
justify the contention of much reduced total capacity. On the
contrary, exogenous and policy induced demand shifts are held
largely responsible for output decline (Brada and King, 1992).
Most important amongst the exogenous factors is the deterioration
of Central Eastern European trade relations. Undeniably, German
unification in 1990 and the dollarisation of CMEA trade in Janu-
ary 1991 applied severe demand shocks to all reforming economies
(Bruno, 1992, see previous section). What room does this leave
for policy overshooting?
The Polish case is interesting since reforms there began before
1992. The loss of the East German market was offset in 1990 by a
rise in convertible currency exports of 51 per cent from $8446
million to $12183 million (Berg and Sachs, 1992). Brada and King
Yugoslavia started reforms in 1990, too. However, its much
higher degree of integration with Western trade and the rela-
tive "purity" of its price system reduce the value of a com-
parison of output falls on the basis of macroeconomic policies.
For an attempt in this direction see Coricelli and Rezende
Rocha (1991).13
conclude that the major factor accounting for the Polish fall in
GDP is a reduction in autonomous consumer demand. They see this
as partly related to consumer goods hoarding before price libera-
lisation but mainly attributable to a large fall in the statisti-
cal real wage (40 per cent in January 1990 alone), which resulted
from overly tight fiscal and monetary policies. Blanchard and
Layard (1992) similarly attribute the fall in aggregate demand to
the redistribution of revenue from wages to profits during price
liberalisation cum stabilisation, while Frydman and Wellisz
(1990) stress the wealth effects of a fall in real household
money balances.
The Keynesian view explains very differently than the strucura-
lists why output initially contracts. The large fall in statisti-
cal real wages changes factor price ratios and justifies a de-
cline in labour productivity across sectors. Low wages imply high
profitability, which helps initial fiscal surpluses at the ex-
pense of household incomes (Schaffer, 1991). However, Keynesians
offer no explanation for persistent inflationary tendencies under
conditions of depressed demand. In fact one would expect falling
prices and low profits (hence emerging budget deficits) in a
deflationary scenario. Hence the Keynesian view needs to be
supplemented with an institutional interpretation of price iner-
tia. As we shall see in section 4 this fundamentally alters the
p
conclusions for economic policy. Another controversy surrounding
the demand-led view of recession concerns the behaviour of inven-
Note that under conditions of high dollarisation in the econo-
my, a price liberalisation combined with inland convertibility
and exchange rate devaluation does not necessarily reduce real
money balances. The Polish evidence reviewed by Gomulka (1991b)
does not confirm this particular contention of a reduction in
monetary wealth,
p
Some authors in the Keynesian tradition have supplemented the
demand-led view of recession with a monopoly pricing interpre-
tation of inflation (Frydman and Wellisz, 1990). This would
rely on the evidence for increased mark-ups in the industrial
sector. As Schaffer (1991) and Pinto et al. (1992) show, the
evidence for Poland tells a different story. A wage price spi-
ral due to cost plus pricing during most of 1990 emerges as the
main explanation for the immediate post-stabilisation inflation
path (see also Section 4).14
tories (Calvo and Coricelli, 1992b). If consumer demand fell
ahead of output then enterprises would be expected to smooth out
production. Inventories should temporarily rise and the recession
should get worse once the fall in inventory investment is added
to the drop in consumer demand (Brada and King, 1992). This se-
quence is directly opposed to the credit crunch view dealt with
next. It is also contradicted by the structuralist explanation of
recession, which places some emphasis on inventory decumulation
in the declining sectors as evidence for improving industrial
efficiency (Gomulka, 1991a).
A falling trend after an initial increase in inventories is thus
not necessarily related to the policy induced depression of de-
mand. Also, it can probably not account chiefly for the lack of
output recovery. Hence the conclusion in favour of demand expan-
sion is flawed at best and dangerously misleading at worst. A
rise in wages would simply spill over into inflation or exacer-
bate recessionary conditions in the industrial sector by reducing
9
further the investable surplus. Fiscal expansion, too, is unre-
alistic since budget figures have turned dramatically negative.
The only alternative lies in investment led growth. The credit
crunch hypothesis discussed next focuses on macroeconomic and
institutional impediments to rising investment activity.
Calvo and Coricelli (Calvo, 1991, Calvo and Coricelli, 1992a; b)
have argued that credit supply constraints rather than deficient
investment demand lie at the heart of prolonged recession in
Central Eastern Europe. In their model"the domestic credit system
discharges its role as an intermediate institution between house-
hold savings and enterprise investment only imperfectly. Under
such conditions lending rates are de facto set by the Central
Bank's refinancing rate. As a legacy from the old system, firms
hold few liquid assets and are thus reliant on short term bank
g
The case of the former GDR is the best example against the view
that higher household incomes may fuel recovery. See Institut
fur Weltwirtschaft (Sept. 1992).15
credit to maintain operations. A high interest rate policy or the
imposition of credit ceilings by the Central Bank, in order to
control the growth of money supply, effectively administer a
credit crunch to the entire industrial sector. The unavailability
of credit or its prohibitive cost forces firms to sell off inven-
tories at the start of a reform program and discontinue major
production lines. At the same time they reduce costs by paying
excessively low wages, which in fact represents borrowing from
employees. Consequently high profitability and low real wages are
not the result of relative price changes per se, but follow from
restrictive monetary policy. One important consequence in such a
scenario is that firms will seek liquidity at the expense of
their suppliers by increasing involuntary trade credits. The
deferment of payment obligations can lead to a bankruptcy spiral
if one weak element in the chain of bad loans and inter-enter-
prise credits is forced to close down. The situation is the more
precarious the larger the legacy of non-performing bank loans to
public sector enterprises (Abel and Bonin, 1992a; Begg and
Portes, 1992). /
The credit crunch hypothesis poses a serious challenge to the
structural interpretation of initial output decline. All firms
are equally affected by the lack of liquidity. This would explain
their uniform reaction in lowering wages and cutting back inven-
tories. If liquidity remains tight, supply continues to be credit
constrained and production may not recover. This implies that
inflation persistence is due to a second round redistribution of
liquidity towards wage earners and hence developing excess demand
as transition proceeds. The upshot of the analysis is that un-
like in the structuralist case efficient and inefficient firms
are involved in the scramble for liquidity, so that restructuring
In Calvo's model stagflation could arise via the cost push
effect of high interest rates (Calvo, 1991). To combine this
with an excess demand view of inflation, Calvo and Coricelli
draw on earlier structuralist development economics, where
high capital costs cause an inward shift of aggregate supply
(van Wijnbergen, 1982; Taylor, 1980). By contrast, we will
stress the reasons for the subsequent unsustainable increase
in wages, rather than the supply constraint. This element is
lacking in Calvo and Coricelli's model.16
is impeded by tight monetary policy. Hence, the focus of sugges-
ted solutions is on improving credit markets (Buch and
Schmieding, 1992).
Still, the fundamental behavioural base for Calvo and Coricelli's
model is not spelled out. For instance, it is not clear why firms
initially lower wages rather than increasing redundancies. More-
over, defaulting on outstanding debt usually involves bankruptcy
in a well functioning market economy. The fact that firms could
rely on involuntary trade credit and defer payment obligations to
banks suggests that their creditors expected to be bailed out at
some future stage. Calvo and Coricelli in fact admit that firms
may have adopted a wait and see attitude when monetary policy was
first tightened (see also Winiecki, 1991). If credit is subse-
quently relaxed this would confirm such expectations. Hence, the
fact that tight monetary policy does not ensure efficient re-
structuring cannot be reversed into the opposite causality.
Looser credit policies would simply fuel renewed wage increases
and the build up of inventories of unsold products. The fundamen-
tal issue concerns the nature of a firm's budget constraint. The
contention of this paper is, that institutional legacies in the
public sector can maintain soft budget constraints for state
owned firms. This phenomenon prevents restructuring and works
against stability. An analytical presentation of the concept of
soft budget constraints is provided in the following section.
SECTION 3: Soft Budget Constraints: an Institutional Framework
Janos Kornai has first introduced the concept of soft budget
constraints to analyse the behavioural differences between the
socialist and the capitalist firm (Kornai, 1980). However, as he
has subsequently stressed (1986; 1990), the idea is not limited
in its application to CPEs. Kornai views Western economies of a
social market type with extensive bureaucracies somewhere in the
middle between completely hard and soft budget constraints.
Hence, the scope of his analysis lies beyond static systems com-
parisons and can be extended to study the legacies of budget17
softness in the transformation process in Central Eastern Europe.
Such an extension has been suggested by drawing on structural
adjustment experiences in the Third World (Nunnenkamp and Schmie-
ding, 1991). While the imposition of hard budget constraints lies
high on the policy agenda in all economic reform programmes,
there are few studies that explicitly develop indicators of
budget softness in order to test Kornai's hypotheses concerning
macroeconomic control and microeconomic efficiency (an exception
is Hofmann and Koop, 1990). This is attempted here and will allow
a comprehensive interpretation of the policy concerns outlined
above.
According to Say's principle any economic actor faces a budget
constraint that limits its projected expenditure to its available
income in each period. In the most simple microeconomic formula-
tion income is generated by the sale of production at a given
market price, and expenditure concerns only factor payments.
Budget constraints are then softened under the following Ren-
ditions (see also Nunnenkamp and Schmieding, 1991; Kornai, 1986):
First, prices and quantities may be administratively determined
rather than market driven. This distorts maximisation at the firm
level and opens room for bargaining down specific plan targets
(Kornai, 1980 provides a detailed description of the process and
its consequences).
Second, output prices could remain upward flexible beyond compe-
titive levels, even in the absence of planning, if domestic con-
centration and protection from foreign competition leave a margin
for monopolistic or cost-plus pricing.
Third, even if prices are competitive, the firm may be granted
access to outside finance. In a dynamic context this may be re-
quired to finance large scale investments. The concern is about
credit at preferential conditions. Preferential access, selective
credit subsidies, negative real interest rates, and the lack of
enforcement of debt servicing obligations are instances of budget
softness.18
Fourth, the state's taxation system inevitably introduces some
distortions into the allocation mechanism. These are aggravated,
when taxes are discretionary, and subsidies in form of direct
transfers to loss making firms may easily be obtained.
A casual look at Western market economies reveals that the pro-
blems listed above are of degree rather than kind. Ideally, one
would want to develop an index of budget softness in a sample of
countries to assess the significance of the phenomenon for econo-
mic performance. Kornai initially established two hypotheses
following from the prevalence of soft budget constraints. On the
one hand, macroeconomic measures alone do not suffice to achieve
price stability in the economy. On the other hand, the distor-
tions in factor and product markets associated with soft budget
constraints reduce allocative efficiency and economic welfare.
Both hypotheses have characterised much of the work on structural
adjustment in the Third World and have informed the widening
policy consensus emerging on the scope for nominal anchors'- in
inflation stabilisation (see Roe, 1991) and the positive role of
liberalisation in economic growth (Sachs ed. , 1990). These les-
sons have influenced the comparatively radical design of economic
packages introduced by Central Eastern European reformers (see
Williamson, 1992, for a very considerate argument in favour of a
minimal big bang). Nonetheless, the main argument in this paper
is that the problems that have surfaced in the transformation
process in Central Eastern Europe so far can be attributed chief-
ly to the remaining areas of budget softness. This contention
raises two points crucial to the subsequent analysis.
First, the examination of only one aspect of economic reform,
such as the "hardening" of credit conditions, is likely to be
misleading in suggesting a radical change in the environment for
the mostly state owned enterprise sector. Other avenues for
increasing revenue by non market means may still be open, some of
them not directly under government control.
An attempt to trace the legacy of soft budget constraints from
central planning to transition, unfortunately with little
empirical evidence, was recently made by Jasinski, 1992.19
Second, there may be a turning point at which remaining areas of
budget softness become less relevant for economic performance. In
fact there may be a trade off between social acceptability of the
market system and efficiency associated with hard budget con-
straints (Kornai, 1986). The fundamental determinant of this
turning point lies in the expectations and consequently the be-
haviour of firms. Following Kornai, it is reached once a credible
bankruptcy threat exists. Hence, apart from quantifiable indica-
tors on prices, protection levels, credit conditions, and the
fiscal stance, an institutional evaluation regarding the exis-
tence and enforcement of the "rules of the market game" also has
to be provided.
The remainder of this section introduces the quantitative indi-
cators that can be used in analysing soft budget constraints. The
focus is mainly on state owned firms (SOEs) since it is suggested
that they have the strongest claims on the state's resources
(Schmieding and Nunnenkamp, 1991; Aspe 1992) and still produce
the larger part of industrial output in Central Eastern Europe.
1) Starting with a gradual relaxation of price controls and de-
centralisation in Hungary after 1968, by now quantitative
planning has been fully dismantled in Central Eastern Europe.
Particularly for the cases of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary,
considered in more detail here, price and quantity controls over-
all have little importance in determining budget constraints.
However, some crucial prices are still under administrative su-
pervision such as for energy and housing (Gomulka, 1992). The
possible, protection low energy prices extend to industry (see
Hare and Hughes, 1991), and the effect of administrative price
increases on the post stabilisation inflation path must be
studied.
2) To measure the extent of protection and consequently the room
for monopoly pricing several indicators present themselves. The
foreign trade sector can be characterised by the level of tariff
and quota protection. Effective protection rates, taking into
account input protection would be desirable but are hard to com-20
12
pute. Nominal tariff rates should be used only as rough indica-
tors. Similarly, the effective exchange rate and the extent of
protection due to upfront devaluation is difficult to quantify
(Gomulka, 1991b), because of the distorted starting point. As an
alternative one may compute import penetration ratios, used in
the literature as a proxy for the degree of trade liberalisation
(Agarwal et al. , 1991). They seem particularly appropriate for
the present study, as they reflect the extent of real competition
on domestic markets, rather than merely policy intentions. On
the domestic side, sectoral concentration ratios provide clues to
the degree of monopolisation. Moreover, even without monopoly
power, there may be an institutional tendency for the socialist
firm in transition to use additional liquidity to grant wage in-
creases in excess of labour productivity growth (for instance
under labour management without property rights, Lipton and
Sachs, 1991; Schaffer, 1991). Competition would not allow this to
fuel into cost-plus pricing and profitability should fall. If it
doesn't, some form of protection must exist. Alternatively, loss
making firms will seek subsidies from the state, which may have
to be granted for political reasons but also because an institu-
tional framework to implement bankruptcies does not exist (Ja-
sinski, 1992). Hence soft budget constraints are closely related
to wage behaviour and profitability.
3) The availability of outside finance is probably the most im-
portant determinant of soft budget constraints. On a macroecono-
mic level a high demand for credit can either be accommodated by
12
The main problem is that inofficial subsidies and transfers
hinder the computation of adequate domestic/foreign price
ratios. When inflation is rapid, year based calculations be-
come meaningless (see also Hare and Hughes, 1991, for an
attempt to measure effective protection by domestic resource
costs).
For instance if a country lacks the foreign exchange necessary
for substantial imports than even with no protection, foreign
competition will be low. Bruno (1992) suggests such a scenario
in explaining positive trade balances in Russia, Bulgaria, and
Romania. On the other hand, it is possible that import pene-
tration ratios do temporarily rise in anticipation of an im-
pendent reversal of trade liberalisation. In this case they
may only imperfectly indicate true competition for domestic
firms.21
expansionary monetary policy or be reflected in a rise in inter-
est rates. For most Central Eastern European countries figures on
the share of credit going to SOEs, the level of interest rates
and possible credit ceilings are available.
However, for institutional reasons these indicators do not adequ-
ately reflect access to credit by SOEs. First, there is the dis-
tribution of credit among the public sector: Due to a legacy of
close personal contacts between bank managers and directors of
SOEs, credit usually does not flow according to criteria of
profitability and expected return (Buch and Schmieding, 1992). A
similar adverse selection problem is found in the rapid increase
in forced suppliers' or interfirm credits (Calvo and Coricelli,
1992a). It is conjectured that due to monetary tightness potenti-
ally profitable firms face liquidity constraints, while ineffici-
ent units survive and destabilise the financial system.
The second institutional legacy that prevents effective monetary
policy is found in the banking sector itself. It is burdened with
a stock of non-performing loans, which it does not enforce, be-
cause a debtor's assets do not match outstanding liabilities, and
because a creditor bail-out is expected as a consequence of the
implicit deposit insurance conveyed with successful convertibili-
ty (Isard et al., 1992, on safety nets in financial liberalisati-
on, Begg and Portes, 1992). Creditor passivity leads to renewed
credits to roll over past loans, which again may go to the wrong
firms. On the other hand, profitable enterprises, particularly in
the private sector, are deterred from new lending, since banks
attempt to recapitalise themselves with high interest spreads.
Soft budget constraints thus exist for the troubled cases in the
public sector. Banks and SOEs are "mortgaging" future financial
stability by building up claims that can only be met by general
14 government bail-out. Finally, one should in theory include
14
For the case of Yugoslavia a central aspect of soft budget
constraints has been found in long term lending at fixed nomi-
nal rates. Under inflationary conditions a large stock of such
loans is an implicit financial subsidy (Kraft and Vodopivec,
1992; see also Buch and Schmieding 1992).22
foreign lending particularly to SOEs as an aspect of budget soft-
ness. The debt of insolvent firms may be nationalised, as happe-
ned in Chile (Agarwal and Nunnenkamp, 1992), particularly if do-
mestic bankruptcy procedures are deficient. For Central Eastern
Europe, however, the cautious lending behaviour by foreign com-
mercial banks should be noted.
4) The degree of budget softness in the fiscal realm has two
components. One concerns discretion in the administration of
taxation. Although much bargaining between public sector managers
and the governments of Central Eastern Europe still takes place,
this is hard to quantify. Kornai (1986) has suggested that there
is a negative correlation of pre and after tax profitability.
However, contrary to his findings for Hungary in the early
1980's, a first glance at the Polish data does not confirm the
view that taxation is used as a method of implicit subsidisation.
For Russia and the CIS the evidence may be quite dif f erent. . The
government may also tolerate the deferment of due taxes as a
selective benefit to some firms. This is a critical aspect of
budget softness if it is used to delay the enforcement of bank-
ruptcy rules. The other fiscal indicator of soft budget con-
straints is the level of direct subsidies as reported in the
government budget.
5) Additional indicators of budget softness primarily concern the
behaviour of output and employment during the sequence of stabi-
lisation and recession. Kornai (1980) has established that firms
with soft budget constraints will display an unsuitable invest-
ment hunger that causes endemic shortages. This is of relevance
to our discussion, since it is connected to overly large stocks
of material inputs and little final product inventories. As
shortages are likely to disappear after price liberalisation
(Gomulka, 1985) one would expect the hoarding of materials to
diminish substantially. On the other hand, stocks of finished
goods may have to increase to satisfy greater production flexi-
bility (Kornai, 1980). This would only make sense if aggregate
demand remains high, or relative prices warrant positive profit23
expectations in the future and justify production smoothing (see
Section 2). This is hardly the case for any of the SOEs in Cen-
tral Eastern Europe. On the contrary, the structural adjustment
required in the industrial sector should draw on all available
sources of liquidity. Hence, a rise in stocks of finished goods
indicates a lack of adjustment in production, rather than produc-
tion smoothing, and the likely presence of soft budget con-
straints . For instance the problem of bad debts may be connected
to bank financing of unsellable production (see Section 4 below,
Pinto et al. 1992).
6) Similarly, the level of employment may not be reduced suffi-
ciently in unprofitable firms if they expect a future bail-out by
the state. Particularly large labour-managed enterprises may
attempt to test their political clout and bargain for subsidies
to prevent politically damaging unemployment. The lower extent of
employment reduction in unprofitable sectors can be used as an
indicator for the prevalence of self management behaviour (see
Ward's second proposition concerning the Illyrian firm; Ward,
1957, and point two above). Moreover, if wages in these sectors
have risen in line with the trend, then some form of budget soft-
ness is bound to exist.
Several points have directed our attention towards institutional
factors that determine a firm's expectations. These issues lie at
the heart of the soft budget constraint idea. In other words, if
firms continue to believe that they will be rescued at some
stage, the toughest macroeconomic programme suffers from a cre-
dibility defect. A crucial mechanism by which firms are forced to
remain within their budget constraints is a Western type bank-
ruptcy law. However, as Brada (1992) shows, this mechanism lacks
the necessary enforcement incentive under social ownership. Con-
sidering such impediments, institutional problems of implementing
market rules must be included in our analysis. The presence of a
coherent bankruptcy law, the number of cases that have yet been
enforced, the monitoring capacity of the banking system, the
progress of privatisation etc. are all relevant factors. The next
section will start by combining the indicators of budget softness24
in an interpretation of the stylised facts of transition as out-
lined in Section 1. Then some empirical evidence focused on
Poland will be presented.
SECTION 4: An Application of the Soft Budget Constraint Concept
to Economic Transformation
4.1 Stylised Facts of Transformation and Soft Budget Constraints
We recall from Section 1 that the four major policy concerns
after three years of economic reforms in Poland (two years else-
where) were the failure of inflation to fall below 20 per. cent
p.a. (except in Czechoslovakia), the sluggish response of output
to the new relative price structure and the ongoing recession in
the economy, the parallel continuing rise in unemployment, and
the increasingly precarious situation of public finances. In
Section 2 we criticised the available interpretations of these
stylised facts for being too general (in the structuralist case)
or for failing to explicitly take into account institutional
arrangements in the microeconomic sphere (in the Keynesian and
credit crunch case). The consequences could be inactivism in the
face of economic decline, or the dangerous advocati'on of policy
reversal. How can the concept of soft budget constraints help to
resolve some of the outstanding policy issues?
On the issue of inflation, Kornai's original hypothesis was that
with soft budget constraints in industry, price liberalisation
would immediately trigger hyperinflation, as excess demand would
not disappear. The medium rates of inflation prevailing currently
in Central Eastern Europe obviously contradict this prediction
(Gomulka, 1991c). However, they may signal that only a partial
hardening of budget constraints has been achieved. Most obvious-
ly, if enterprise losses are financed out of the state budget,
then under the current fiscal strains, the inflation tax may be
Note, however, that the example of the CIS actually comes very
close to his diagnosis.25
the politically most attractive short run option. Furthermore,
soft budget constraints are claimed to exist in the state sector
if wage rises exceed labour productivity. This danger is par-
ticularly pending if either competition is lacking, or state
enterprises can undermine monetary austerity, by extending trade
credits and defaulting on bank loans, due to the absence of bank-
ruptcy enforcement. The focus on wages implies a strong position
of workers in enterprise bargaining. In this respect the institu-
tional legacy of worker management provides a plausible interpre-
tation. Combined with remaining soft budget constraints it can
account both for cost-plus pricing and for the lack of re-
structuring, thus allowing for a combination of excess demand and
inertia in explaining the post stabilisation inflation path.
While the existence of soft budget constraints cannot as such
account for the initial fall in output, the presence of soft
budget constraints may explain why recovery is so slow. New
entrants are bared from the market dominated by inefficient,
subsidised firms. Labour and capital resources are bound, if a
lack of competition distorts factor payments and for instance
allows excessive wage increases. In the banking sector the
attempt to build up reserves against bad loans may lead to huge
interest margins, that effectively crowd out the private sector
(Begg and Portes, 1992). Moreover, adverse selection in the allo-
Schmieding (1991) provides a very insightful analysis on the
"nature of the transformation crisis" in which the collapse of
previous institutional arrangements emerge as the primary
reason for output falls besides factor price rigidities and
reallocation costs. Following his arguments, soft budget con-
straints may be at the core of an "institutional void", since
they prevent the substitution of macroeconomic policy control
for the previous system of central regulation. In any case,
our arguments against deflationary policies on the basis of
macroeconomic interpretations of the crisis apply under both a
structural and an institutional scenario.
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In Yugoslavia the combination of labour management and sub-
sidised credit has led to an inefficient capital intensity
bias of industry (Estrin, 1983; Lydall 1980). The difficulty
of matching high wages in the socialised sector contributes to
the small share of private investments in large scale industry
in many Third World countries. See Langhammer (1984) for the
case of Africa. Frydman and Wellisz similarly argue that high
wage levels present an exogenous cost push factor for the
marginal firm (Frydman and Wellisz, 1990).26
cation of credit starves potentially profitable firms form in-
vestment capital. Most significantly, soft budget constraints
lead to the adoption of a wait-and-see attitude by managers. It
shifts their attention to the political sphere and there the
costs of efficiency improving measures are prohibitively high.
Lobbying and rent-seeking instead of productive action is the
result.
It should also be evident that soft budget constraints are the
primary reason behind the slow pace of labour shedding. As long
as wages can be paid, SOEs will retain the largest possible la-
bour force. This can be related partly to attentism in the state
sector, i.e. expecting political rather than economic solutions,
and worker management at the firm level.
The implications of soft budget constraints for the government's
fiscal deficit should be clear. Initially firms have no choice
than to accept the cut in subsidies and the discontinuation of
quasi fiscal deficits financed by Central Bank credit. Old habits
die hard, however, and once it has become evident that the entire
credit system has come under strain, a resumption of subsidies is
expected. Particularly interesting is the strong connection of
state finances to public sector profits. Protection of state
monopolies is in the government's short form interest since it
secures profit transfers and limits the number of unemployed
drawing on the state's safety net. By contrast, the fiscal bene-
fit in a growing private sector that is so far better equipped to
evade taxation altogether is not immediately realised. Only com-
petition, if necessary from outside, can expose the government to
the real extent of its losses due to an inefficient public sector
and induce the necessary tax reform. Current fiscal deficits, in
this interpretation, have more to do with the delay of public
finance restructuring than with transitory revenue problems. This
is not to deny that the introduction of VAT and personal income
taxes is a lengthy process and that tax reform will be difficult
(Tanzi, 1991). However, deficits should be scrutinised as to
their underlying reason, before tolerance of transitory imbalance27
is advocated. We will return to these matters in the concluding
section. Let us now turn to the evidence for soft budget con-
straints in Poland and relate it to the data presented in Section
1.
4.2: Evidence from Poland
The case of Poland confirms the contention that the evidence for
soft budget constraints may lie behind aggregate macroeconomic
data. Only when looking closely at the microeconomic and insti-
tutional mechanisms guiding economic behaviour in the state owned
enterprise sector could clear indications of budget softness be
identified. We will nonetheless present the general picture on
the indicators for softness as discussed in Section 3 first,
including macroeconomic policy and price and trade liberalisa-
tion. Subsequently, we will turn to the three major areas of
budget softness in Poland, namely adverse selection in the credit
market, interfirm credits, and the lack of bankruptcy enforce-
ment, tax payment delays and the fiscal deficit, and finally wage
payments in excess of labour productivity, used as a proxy for
non-maximising behaviour.
Due to the liberalisation of most prices in January 1990, price
controls by now play virtually no role in the Polish economy.
Hence, the degree of budget softness due to implicit input sub-
sidies has substantially diminished. This is confirmed by a look
at the development of energy prices. The prices of coal, power
and fuel all rose by substantially more than the producer price
index (PPI) (Table 2). The 550 per cent increase in coal prices
in 1990, followed by a 95 per cent rise in 1991, in particular,
has diminished protection of the industrial sector due to low
18 energy prices. In 1990, coal still accounted for 70 per cent of
X 8
On the extent of such protection prior to price liberalisation
see Hare and Hughes (1991). Basing their research on a 1988
input-ouput table, they find that 23.6 per cent of industrial
enterprises in Poland were producing negative value added at
world prices.28




























Source: GUS, various issues.
all energy supply in Poland (Nowak, 1991). By the end of 1992,
the government is committed to fully liberalise coal prices, and
the target has so far been kept (Gomulka, 1992). Crude oil im-
ports from the former Soviet Union are traded at the average
world market price of the previous three years since the start of
1991. Hence the subsidisation of Central Eastern Europe through
cheap energy can be said to have all but vanished. One would
expect that firms are consequently forced to cut costs and reduce
energy intensity. For much of Polish heavy industry this implies
likely closure of plants. Precisely this has only happened to a
very ]imited extent. There seem to be other areas of budget soft-
ness that delay the restructuring required by new relative pri-
ces .
Since the end of 1990 there is little room for avoiding re-
structuring through monopoly or cost plus pricing in Poland (see
also Schaffer, 1991; Pinto et al. , 1992), inspite of the remai-
ning predominance of large scale SOEs. The main reason is the
substantial increase in foreign competition, removing one area of
budget softness. In line with price liberalisation, the country
has opened its foreign trade sector with the onset of reform in
1990. Low nominal tariffs of around 15 per cent and a fixed ex-
change rate policy followed from January 1990 until May 19 91 are
the main elements behind the rise in imports from Western part-29
ners.
The sequence of rising import penetration is important. As Table
3 shows, import penetration ratios rose substantially in every
sector (except fuel, power) between 1990 and 1991. Following the
experiences in other heterodox stabilisation programs using a
nominal exchange rate anchor, Poland opted for a large initial
devaluation of 75 per cent (Bruno, 1992). This provided a tempo-
rary protective shield to Polish enterprises, which together with
Table 3 - Import Penetration Ratios by Industrial





































Source: GUS, various issues.
the substantial gains on material inventories helps to explain
the extraordinary profit levels in Polish industry at the start
of economic reform (Gomulka, 1991b; Schaffer 1991). The cumula-
tive price increase of 250 per cent during 1990 meant that import
competition became binding around the fall of that year. Since
September 19 90 one can observe a steep rise in imports towards a
plateau roughly twice the level during the first half of 1990.
With only some delay, enterprise profitability has fallen drama-
tically (Table 4). The conclusion seems to be that foreign compe-
tition has strongly limited the ability of inefficient SOEs to
19
The EEC increased its share in total imports from 33.8 per
cent in 1989 to 49.9 per cent in 1991 (Foreign Trade Research
Institute, 1992).30
Table 4 - Total Imports and Gross Profit-
ability of Polish industry,
monthly, Sept. 1990-July 1992
Imports gross fin.result/
total costs
























Source: NBP, var. iss..; GUS, var. iss.
















































Import competition was also triggered by the rise in consumer
demand due to the substantial increase in real wages since Sep-
tember 1990. The coincidence of wage rises with falling profits
suggests that inspite of import competition other areas of budget
softness remained.
It is a well known fact that monetary policy during the first
half of 1990 was extremely tight (Calvo and Coricelli, 1992; Go-
20 This is particularly the case in the consumer goods sector,
whose share in total imports increased by from 21.5 per cent
in 1990 to 34.7 per cent in 1991 (Foreign Trade Research In-
stitute, 1992). Consequently, losses in light and consumer
goods industries are highest (see Frydman and Wellisz, 1990).31
mulka, 1991). This reflects the government's commitment to estab-
lish hard credit conditions for state owned enterprises. As Table
5 reveals, credits by the banking sector to SOEs rose by only
52.6 per cent in nominal terms in the first quarter, while cumu-
lative inflation was 13 2 per cent in March. Over the year, the
socialised sector was able to obtain a 218 per cent increase in
bank credit, which resulted from a relaxation of monetary policy
in the summer (Gomulka, 19 91b; Winiecki, 1991). Over the same pe-
riod the PPI rose by 191.5 per cent, the CPI by 250 per cent. In
1991, the trend of a small real increase in credit to the soci-
alised sector using the PPI deflator was continued.
By and large monetary aggregates were kept firmly under control.
Particularly the Central Bank's refinancing rate was repeatedly
used to stem inflationary tendencies (Winiecki, 1991). Interest
rates, given by the Central Bank's refinancing rate rose by over
21 20 percentage points in nominal terms in January 1990. Real
interest rates were positive from March to June 1990, and again
for most of 1991 (Table 6). In that latter year, average prime
rates on loans with lowest risk were up to 18 per cent above the
refinancing rate and interest margins reached 56 per cent points
in March (Begg and Portes, 1992). In April 1992, demand deposits
were remunerated at 5.5-20 per cent, while credits with low risk
had an annual cost of 40-58 per cent, making for generally posi-
tive real interest rates on loans and maintaining interest
spreads. The explanation lies in the attempt of banks to recapi-
22 talise themselves by charging high and paying low interest. On
21
It is widely debated whether the high nominal cost of credit
had a negative impact on industrial production, as claimed
mainly by Calvo and Coricelli (1992a). Pinto et al. (1992)
present recent evidence to the effect that high interest rates
did reduce sales, but by far less than depressed demand,
proxied by the ability to charge mark-up prices. As we shall
demonstrate below, indeed, the effectiveness of high interest
rates in hardening budget constraints was severely limited.
22
The introduction of reserve requirements (25 per cent on de-
mand deposits below 3 months and 10 per cent on fixed term
accounts as of April 1992, NBP 1992) by the Central Bank and
the need to make allowances for non-performing assets are the
reasons behind the attempt of banks to build up their capital
base. This clearly is an institutional problem, connected
chiefly to soft budget constraints in the credit market, due
to a large stock of bad debts.32
Table 5 - Growth of Domestic Credit, Money Supply, and Inflation, quarterly
1990-91, increase in per cent over previous end of year figures
Increase 1990
(in per cent)
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the face of it, it seems that the cost of credit made it unat-
tractive to borrow oneself out of liquidity problems. However, as
we shall see below, the perverse incentive structure in the state
owned banking system, connected to the lack of bankruptcy en-
forcement, undermined monetary austerity, and particularly the
use of interest rate policy to end loans to inefficient SOEs.33






















































































































Note: Yearly rates in brackets.
Yearly inflation figures for 1990 are of little meaning since they
mainly reflect the hyperinflation in the fall of 1989 and the January
1990 price hikes.
Source: NBP, var. iss.
A look at the central budgetary figures gives the impression of
tight fiscal discipline at the start of the reform program and a
relaxation since. For our purposes, the behaviour of subsidies is
munparticularly relevant. They are one crucial element of budget
softness. In 1989 subsidies reached 15 per cent of GDP and could
thus account entirely for the 8 per cent fiscal shortfall. For
1992 a deficit of a similar magnitude is expected, but subsidies
are to reach only 2 per cent of GDP (Table 7). The major reason
for the gap lies in a dramatic fall of central budgetary revenue
and a parallel rise in social welfare commitments. This is what
one would expect in a situation of depressed industrial activity
and rising unemployment. Hence, Gomulka argues that the govern-
ment's continous financing of a generous indexed pension scheme,
costing an estimated 4.8 per cent of GDP in 1992 is one of the
major stumbling blocs for fiscal consolidation (Gomulka, 1992).
On the other hand, the shortfall on the revenue side is entirely
due to much reduced enterprise profitability in the public sec-
tor. Fiscal policy thus seems to suffer from transitional bur-
dens, namely the problems of shifting tax revenue away from the
public industrial sector and the high cost of a politically ne-34























































































cessary social safety net. Soft budget constraints in form of
subsidies to state owned firms apparently do not contribute in
large measure to budgetary problems. However, the impression of
hard budget constraints is deceiving. As is argued below, the
lack of tax enforcement alone could account for the revenue
shortfall. This represents an institutional legacy of budget
softness which again can be related to deficient bankruptcy en-
forcement and a perverse incentive structure within the public
sector in general.
According to the evidence presented so far, budget constraints
have hardened in the area of foreign competition, price admi-
nistration, fiscal subsidies, and cost of credit. Nonetheless, we
have identified several features in the adjustment process of35
Polish industry which pointed at remaining areas of budget soft-
ness. Effective hardening has to proceed on all fronts. In what
follows we will present indicators for institutional legacies of
budget softness at a sectoral level. For 1990 I shall draw heavi-
ly on the results of the firm based survey by Pinto et al.
(1992). Unfortunately, in the more aggregated picture conveyed by
Polish national statistics, econometric evidence has to be re-
placed by more general impressions. However, one of Pinto's cru-
cial findings, namely that soft budget constraints still exist in
Polish industry, can be strongly confirmed.
The first point to be considered concerns credit markets in the
transformation process (see also Abel and Bonin, 1992; Begg and
Portes, 1992, Buch and Schmieding, 1992). When discussing appro-
priate indicators of budget softness, reference was made to the
role of interfirm credit and the legacy of bad debts in undermi-
ning monetary control. Traditionally, short term credit from the
Central Bank and suppliers' credit were the main vehicles used by
the socialist firm to maintain liquidity (Calvo and Coricelli,
1992a). With economic reform, the first option was ir.ade prohibi-
tively expensive. Thus interfirm credits rose in nominal terms
during the first half of 1990, albeit from a much reduced level
compared to December 1989 (Graph 3). Payment arrears were used in
addition to nominal wage discipline to maintain liquidity in the
first period of the reform. Rather than an adjustment to tougher
macroeconomic conditions as suggested by Calvo and Coricelli,
this seems to indicate a wait-and-see attitude. At the end of
1990, interfirm credits were still around 180 per cent of bank
credit to the enterprise sector. For 1991, figures calculated
from Biuletyn Statystyczny (GUS) yield a ratio of around 140 per
23 cent. This is unduly high by international standards. For in-
23
The exact figures were 139 per cent in March, 137 per cent in
June, 134 per cent in September, and 146 per cent in December
1991. In March 1992 the ratio had fallen to 130 per cent. One
problem with these data is that interfirm credit as such is
not quoted by GUS. I have taken it to be the stock of liabili-
ties resulting from the delivery of works and services. For
1990 using those figures gives estimates of interfirm credit
as a ratio of bank credit much below the Calvo and Coricelli
data. One item that may have been included in their data is
recapitalised interest. Unfortunately, they do not identify an
exact source of their data, which may have been obtained from
unofficial publications by the Central Bank.36
Graph 3 - Interfirm Credit index (Dec. 1989=100), and as a Share
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Source: Calvo and Coricelli (1992b).
stance Begg and Portes (1992) give a comparative figure of 65 per
cent for the UK in 1990. Interfirm credit continues to be a con-
venient way of solving short term liquidity problems for SOEs,
particularly since it is rarely connected to the ability to repay
at a later stage. The fact that it has fallen since 1990 does not
indicate that budget constraints in this area have hardened.
Rather, alternative forms of liquidity have become available.
This brings us to the problem of bad debts.
At the beginning of 1990, enterprise profitability was very high.
Consequently, firms' access to credit was probably not impeded by
considerations of lacking creditworthiness. Moreover bad debts
were not substantial in Poland due to the hyperinflation of the
last months of 1989 (Gomulka, 1991b).
2
3 Nonetheless, because of
23 This is in contrast to Hungary, where the legacy of bad debts
dating from the pre-reform period is seen as the major impedi-
ment to banking reform (Abel and Bonin, 199 2a).37
the high costs of borrowing, SOEs seem to have been reluctant to
increase their reliance on loans, as long as profits were high
and costs could be kept down. Using a sample of 65 SOEs, Pinto et
al. (1992) have regressed the ratio of debt in total costs
against net payables from interfirm credits, pre-tax profitabili-
ty plus interest payments, and the stock of finished goods. They
find a small but insignificant degree of substitutability of debt
and interfirm credit, a highly significant negative relation of
debt to profitability, and a positive and significant effect of
stocks on the level of indebtedness from the end of 1989 to the
first quarter of 1991. This illustrates the adverse selection
problem in the Polish banking sector. Profitable firms did not
borrow7 possibly expecting a return of lower interest rates soon.
As long as current payments could be maintained, loans were not
taken. This left banks with the bleak alternative to finance
stockbuilding in non-profitable SOEs in order to recycle some of
25 the huge increase in household deposits (see Table 5). Banks
continued to finance losses, a clear indication of soft budget
constraints.
Since the beginning of 1991 enterprise profitability has fallen
dramatically. If the above relationship is to hold continously,
this would imply a rise in bank lending to SOEs. As we have seen
above this took place in only moderate proportions. As Pinto et
al. point out, most enterprises were starting to complain about a
liquidity constraint by the middle of 1991. The main alternative
avenue for avoiding to cut costs at the firm level was to default
on current payments. Hence the bad debt problem has reemerged
with a vengeance in Poland. According to Gazeta Bankowa (Nr 32,
25
Obviously no bank was forced to lend at all. However, as re-
serves have to be set aside for deposits, on which until April
1992 no interest was paid, banks had to do something with
their money to prevent a continous depreciation of their capi-
tal base. Behind their behaviour lies the expectation that
somehow SOEs will be bailed out and loans will be repaid. An
interesting parallel concerns the attitude of commercial banks
vis a vis sovereign debtors in the Third World, as long as IMF
or Paris Club support was extended. The problems of moral
hazard and good money chasing bad money are considered in Begg
and Portes (1992).38
1992) 30-40 per cent of total money supply are non-performing
loans. By the end of 1991, 2332 firms had lost creditworthiness
2 6 according to banks. In May 19 9 2 this figure amounted to 4 300
(Jasinski, 1992). Although the major increase in numbers is in
the agricultural sector, the industrial sector still has a more
than 50 per cent share in the total debt (NBP, 1992). Debt de-
fault has thus become a crucial aspect of soft budget con-
straints .
Note that as most banks are still in state ownership, the current
problems of the banking system in fact represent a concealed fis-
cal deficit. On these grounds, Begg and Portes (1992) and Buch
and Schmieding (1992) advocate a recapitalisation of banks by the
government via taking over bad debts from SOEs in the form of in-
dexed bonds, which are secure against possible future inflation.
In this way, the quasi fiscal deficit in the financial sector
27 would be made explicit. Two questions remain: First, should
debts be cancelled completely (Buch and Schmieding, 1992) or
simply be transfered to the central budget (Begg and Portes,
1992), allowing the government to recoup some of the costs by
future additional taxes? We take the first view, because only
debt cancellation allows an SOE to asses its competitiveness
without any inherited burden. Second, it is not clear that even
debt cancellation, although necessary to stop adverse selection
in financial markets, would cancel the current cash flow problems
for a large number of SOEs, which are due to low competitiveness.
Hence Buch and Schmieding (1992) advocate additional credit caps
A firm is declared uncreditworthy if it defaults on interest
payments for more than three months. As Pinto et al. , 1992
point out the figures by the banking sector are likely to be
underestimates. Banks are faced with the threat of a run on
deposits if the extent of the problem was to be made public.
The bankruptcy law forces them to set aside sufficient re-
serves for non-performing loans. This reduces banking sector
profitability and undermines recapitalisation efforts (Begg
and Portes, 1992). As long as it remains unclear who is to
bear the costs of financial instability, the disincentive for
banks to open their books will remain.
27
For Poland Begg and Portes (1992) suggest a figure of 2-3 per
cent of GDP increase in the fiscal deficit if the central
budget were to assume bad debts of SOEs.39
for SOEs and argue for rapid privatisation after balance sheets
have been cleared. This will inevitably involve a much stricter
enforcement of bankruptcies, which at the moment suffers from in-
centive defects considered below.
One interesting recent development is the substantial fall of
stocks of finished products in real terms (Graph 4) since around
March 1991, after a substantial rise during 1990 (Calvo and Cori-
celli, 1992b, Pinto et al., 1992). It is possible that this indi-
cates some adjustment of industrial production to the decline in
demand, this time resulting mainly from the collapse of the CMEA.
We have argued before that rising stocks signal soft budget con-
straints. This was particularly the case during 1990 when rising
inventories were closely related to bank credit (Pinto et al.,
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28 1992). Possibly, then, the availability of credit to finance
stocks has decreased and budget constraints may have hardened.
However, the main concern for the SOE is the payment of wages and
the minimisation of employment reductions. To this effect, a fall
in inventory investment may be required, in order to gain liqui-
dity. The decline in inventories does not necessarily signal that
a behavioural change in the public sector has taken place.
Fiscal policy may confer a substantial degree of budget softness
for SOEs in Poland, inspite of the reduction in subsidies. The
main reason is the tolerance of tax deferments by enterprises.
Jasinski (1992) refers to press reports in Polityka (35, 1992)
according to which in June 1992 1400 enterprises had tax overdues
to the budget. Statystyka Polski (9, 1992) puts the sum of tax
deferments at 28.8 trl zl for August, a small increase from 26.1
trl zl in January. The cumulated budget deficit for August was
30.5 trl zl. Hence, our main conclusion that lax taxing can ex-
plain much of the fiscal problems clearly holds. A further in-
teresting aspect is that the major share of deferments were
accounted for by dividend tax payments and the PPWW tax (or
"popiwek"), levied on wage increases above the tax based incomes
policy (TIP) norm (Table 8). Both taxes are made from after-tax
profits. As profitability fell in 1991, clearly, the government's
ability to collect revenue declined. Moreover, the loose enforce-
ment of the "popiwek" creates a disincentive for wage discipline
with harmful consequences for enterprise restructuring. Let us
consider some underlying institutional reasons for these fiscal
29 developments.
If an SOE delays tax payments by three months, the bankruptcy law
of September 1, 1991 automatically triggers liquidation or re-
op
The positive correlation of stocks to enterprise debt, as
mentioned in the previous paragraph, is a clear indication of
budget softness and implicitly contradicts the notion of a
credit crunch in the industrial sector. On the contrary, our
contention of a wait-and-see strategy by inefficient SOEs
finds support in this piece of evidence.
29
What follows draws heavily on Pinto et al. (1992).41
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structuring procedures. If we accept Jasinski's numbers this
would have involved roughly 50 per cent of the 3000 state owned
enterprises in industry by June this year. As restructuring
usually involves the provision of fresh funds, it is scarcely
successful. Liquidation is interpreted as the attempt to regain
liquidity by the sale of current assets. Only if the latter do
not match outstanding liabilities is bankruptcy invoked, meaning
effective closure of an economic unit. For the government all
three options involve substantial costs. The budgetary strains
prohibit additional transfers to SOEs, thus making restructuring
elusive. Liquidation is hampered by the unclear structure of
property rights, for instance in the case of restitution of land.
Moreover, the extent of financial problems in industry leads to a
30 The actual number of liquidations is lower, reaching a total
of 1250 by June 1992, of which only 30 per cent were comple-
ted. The number of liquidations enforce due to financial pro-
blems reached only 7 08, of which 7 8 were completed (Heinrich,
1992). A breakdown into industry, agriculture and services is
not available, neither are figures on the number of restructu-
ring cases.42
rapid increase in the supply of assets and hence a reduction in
their market value. Finally, the administrative costs of bank-
ruptcy procedures can be substantial. For instance severance pay-
ments may consume most of the proceeds from asset sales, if a
firms is closed down. In sum, the legal provisions are defective
since their stringent application involves costs for the govern-
ment, which it avoids (if only temporarily) by granting tax de-
ferments .
As noted above, the largest share of enterprise liabilities are
owed to the predominantly sate-owned banking sector. Often the
value of an SOE's assets does not cover the stock of its debt. As
long as banks have a faint hope that the government will bail out
the public enterprise sector and some debt will be repaid, they
will not initiate the required bankruptcy procedures either. The
granting of tax deferments provides support for such attentism.
Lax tax enforcement thus aggravates the incentive problems in the
banking sector. The unwillingness of the government to take a
decisive step and expose itself to the necessary costs of indus-
trial restructuring may jeopardise its reform efforts elsewhere.
Soft budget constraints wastefully bind resources needed for
renewed growth.
The incentive structure at the firm level reveals a final aspect
of soft budget constraints in Polish industry. In Section 3 it
was claimed that the socialist enterprise in transition may be
characterised as effectively worker managed. This implies that
SOEs would attempt to pay wage increases in excess of labour
productivity growth as long as soft budget constraints existed.
The peculiar development of real wages since the onset of reform
has been discussed by several authors (Calvo and Coricelli,
1992b; Schaffer, 1991; Frydman and Wellisz, 1990). Until the fall
of 1990, nominal wages stayed below the norm given by the TIP in
all sectors of industry. Moreover, sectoral differences in wage
increases were closely related to sectoral profitability
(Schaffer, 1991). However, around October 1990 most sectors ex-
ceeded the TIP norm, inspite of the general fall in profitability
due to the increase in import competition (Graph 5), The indexa-43
Graph 5 - Nominal Wage and Wage Norm, Five Sectors of Polish
Industry, 1990
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tion of nominal wages to inflation and the ability to carry over
unused margins from the beginning of the year may have created a
wage price spiral that explains the post stabilisation inflation
until the end of 1990.
In 1991 the relationship between wage increases and profitability
was much more erratic, primarily because loss making firms were
keeping in line with the trend in wage increases (Graph 6). The
room for offsetting such rises in costs by cost-plus pricing was
limited after the increase in foreign competition. Wage increases
in unprofitable firms reflect myopic behaviour on part of the SOE
management. A look at the sluggish reduction in employment
30 Real wages did not rise above the December 1990 level in the
industrial sector as a whole until December 1991 (Table 10).
They have since remained on that level. Polish people do com-
plain frequently about insufficient incomes. Real wage statis-
tics would seem to support the view that wage rises were not
excessive in 1991. However, the December 1990 real wage had
already caught up with the inflated December 1989 level. Given
the lag of employment reduction behind output falls, this
level was clearly unsustainable. The rise in nominal wages in
line with inflation rather suggests that worker managed firms
had not understood the fundamental link of factor payments to
productivity. The main reason seems to be that there were no
sanctions for misbehaviour, i.e. soft budget constraints re-
mained .45
Graph 6 -
The relationship of wages to profitability
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confirms this view (Table 9). In all sectors employment fell by
less than production in 1991, continuing a trend from 1990. This
accounts for the dramatic gap between wage increases and labour
productivity growth. The already high share of labour costs in
value added (see Hare and Hughes, 1991) has thus further in-
creased and competitiveness has fallen.
In a competitive market economy myopic behaviour leads to exit.
In an economy with soft budget constraints this selection mecha-
nism is impeded by the tolerance of losses. Managers of socia-
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Table 10 - Real Wages in Polish Industry 1991, 1992 (zloty)
a
^ ?^. March
1991 94 99 98 94 90 88
1992 102 101 107 108 99 100
July
 AH2.i §2E
t:i_ °E^J. _ _ ^2
V^ _
DeE
1991 92 91 90 95 96 102
1992 105 103
In US$ at market exchange rate, 1991
Jan. _ Ffb. _March Agril_ May _
158 178 185 183 164 151
July _
 AH2.i _ Sept. _0
ct • Nov. Dec.
157 158 162 173 184 198
a Gross incl. profit payments.
Source: GUS, var. iss.
snce. Workers' preferences are entirely concentrated on employ-
a
ment and wage payments. Under conditions of general economic
recession, workers know that private employment may be difficult
to obtain. This explains their short termism. Similarly, in the
absence of property rights, workers will not assume responsibility
for the effective mortgaging of an SOE's assets by tax and credit
32 defaults or asset depletion. The manager of such an SOE faces a
comparable incentive problem. He is accountable to politicians
and not to shareholders. If he advances the closure of his unit,
he will not only loose his reputation amongst workers and the
government alike, but also his job. It is clear, that as long as
alternatives in form of soft budget constraints are available the
manager will choose not to initiate bankruptcy procedures.
32
Schmieding (1991) talks of "end games" in this respect.48
SECTION 5: Conclusions
The evidence from Poland has confirmed the relevance of soft
budget constraints in the transformation process in Central Eas-
tern Europe. Thereby, institutional aspects were found to be more
important than loose macroeconomic policy. The effect of soft
budget constraints for SOEs threatens to undermine the successful
macroeconomic stabilisation program itself in Poland. The adverse
selection problem in the financial sector, where banks have no
interest in initiating bankruptcy, has led to the build up of a
stock of bad debts that hangs like a shadow over monetary stabi-
lity. The growing fiscal deficit since 1991 has probably contri-
buted to the perpetuation of inflationary tendencies, after the
inertial effects of wage adjustments in 1990. Finally, the beha-
viour of SOEs in terms of wage payments further undermines
profitability and increases the liquidity problems for the public
sector as a whole. All three elements hinder industrial re-
structuring and delay economic recovery.
A project of economic reform of such broadness as those currently
implemented in Central Eastern Europe cannot be conducted only
with the goal of macroeconomic stability in mind. Some authors
have therefore suggested that more rapid restructuring does in-
volve a lower degree of stability (Gomulka, 1991b). Unfortunate-
ly, this trade-off does not obtain in Poland at the moment. Re-
structuring is impeded by soft budget constraints and macroecono-
mic control has become increasingly weaker. The major gap in
government policy seems to be the lack of enforcement of bank-
ruptcy procedures. The current arrangements suffer from major
incentive defects, due to completely unsustainable balance sheets
both in the financial and the industrial sector, and unclarified
ownership rights.
The most important tasks emerging for the government are finan-
cial reforms and rapid privatisation. The proposal for clearing
all balance sheets with a clean sweep has already been mentioned.
In addition to this necessary step, it has recently been sugges-
ted to speed up the privatisation process by transferring legal49
property rights to current de facto owners (Heinrich, 1992). This
"spontaneous" privatisation, to the benefit of workers and man-
agers, could serve to eliminate some of the incentive problems
behind soft budget constraints.
Most importantly, private owners would have an incentive to maxi-
mise the value of their assets and establish creditworthiness. If
bad debts have previously been cancelled, firms will seek to
present positive balances in order to attract credit. Managers
may eventually implement the necessary restructuring measures and
thus improve the long run prospects for economic growth.
From the government's point of view, debt cancellation and the
transfer of ownership rights could be used as credibility en-
hancing policy measures, that cut the link between previous SOEs
and the state, once and for all (see Funke, 1991, on the role of
credibility in the transformation process). The exposition of
large fiscal deficits by assuming all bad debts and foregoing
future privatisation revenue, would make it clear that more
transfers from the government cannot be expected. This could
change lending behaviour, too, although transitional credit caps
to remaining SOEs may still be warranted. In the long run, only
new revenue from an expanding private tax base will be able to
restore fiscal balance.
Finally, the political threat of large-scale unemployment would
be best met by creating the conditions for a rapid growth of
private sector job opportunities. Inefficient firms, once priva-
tised, could use the sale of worker shares to new investors as a
source of revenue for severance payments. Although increasing
redundancies as a result of bankruptcy enforcement would further
burden the budget with social welfare expenditures, the elimina-
tions of current transfers through tax deferments would at least
allow a realistic assessment of transitory fiscal costs.
33
On the role of private property rights in economic recovery in
Central Eastern Europe, see Kornai, 1990; North, 1992.
34
On the fiscal costs of new effective bankruptcy rules in
Hungary, see Abel and Bonin, 19 9 2c.50
At the very root of such a strategy, however, must be the wil-
lingness of the government to stop tolerating loss-making in all
firms, whether private or public. The costs of industrial re-
structuring cannot be avoided, but they can be reduced if appro-
priate incentive structures are established. Soft budget con-
straints only result in slow decay. They bind resources needed
elsewhere and, hence, lead to an unambigous net welfare loss.
Foreign observers and donors should press hard on these issues.
Particularly the underlying causes for the development of macro-
economic target variables should be understood. As long as soft
budget constraints remain, macroeconomic policy is not sufficient
for stability and growth.51
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